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Abstract
Militant groups hiding in Myanmar launch cross-border attacks into
India, killing soldiers and civilians. The Indian Army has responded by
launching cross-border military incursions into Burmese territory. After
decades of trial and failure to curb the militants, a reciprocated spirit of
cooperation for the first time seems to characterize India and Myanmar’s
joint efforts in fighting them. This article analyses the evolution of these
efforts and argues that a sum of dovetailing drivers have created space
for enhancing countermilitancy cooperation in an ambivalent and
distrustful relationship. Central elements are an overall improvement in
bilateral relations, India’s need to counter China’s growing influence in
its neighbourhood, Myanmar’s urge to diversify its benefactors, the
urgency of stabilizing India’s northeast, Myanmar’s domestic security
calculations, as well as a large untapped economic cooperation potential.
Despite increasing countermilitancy cooperation, difficult challenges
remain as Myanmar has ceasefire agreements with India-hostile militants
residing on its territory. The relationship is caught in a complex
interstate order in a mix of conflict and cooperation, between the use of
extraterritorial force and its acceptance.
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ABSTRACT
Militant groups hiding in Myanmar launch cross-border attacks into 
India, killing soldiers and civilians. The Indian Army has responded by 
launching cross-border military incursions into Burmese territory. After 
decades of trial and failure to curb the militants, a reciprocated spirit of 
cooperation for the first time seems to characterize India and Myanmar’s 
joint efforts in fighting them. This article analyses the evolution of 
these efforts and argues that a sum of dovetailing drivers have created 
space for enhancing countermilitancy cooperation in an ambivalent and 
distrustful relationship. Central elements are an overall improvement in 
bilateral relations, India’s need to counter China’s growing influence in its 
neighborhood, Myanmar’s urge to diversify its benefactors, the urgency 
of stabilizing India’s northeast, Myanmar’s domestic security calculations, 
as well as a large untapped economic cooperation potential. Despite 
increasing countermilitancy cooperation, difficult challenges remain as 
Myanmar has ceasefire agreements with India-hostile militants residing on 
its territory. The relationship is caught in a complex interstate order in a 
mix of conflict and cooperation, between the use of extraterritorial force 
and its acceptance.
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INTRODUCTION
What are the drivers behind the upsurge in Indo-Burmese counter-
militancy cooperation after decades of disengagement? The areas along 
the 1,643 km India–Myanmar border have since the 1950s been a scene of 
ethno-nationalist-driven, low-intensity conflict, deteriorating the state-to-
state relationship. Cooperation in fighting transnational militant groups 
and Burmese attempts at curbing India-hostile militants for decades has 
been lukewarm, at best. Their relationship has despite periodical and 
partial upswings been characterized by disengagement and distrust, 
even hostility.1 In early 2017, Indian Assamese police forces assessed that 
2,500 Indian militants were residing in sanctuaries in Myanmar.2 A further 
complicating matter is that the Burmese have a ceasefire agreement with 
militants that actively launch cross-border attacks into Indian Territory, 
and once were a shared security threat. India, on its side, no longer seems 
to host anti-Burmese militants. 
Despite this severe and continuing challenge, in recent years a spirit of 
cooperation has appeared as a more prominent feature in Indo-Burmese 
counter-militancy cooperation for the first time. In the past decade, 
the two states have signed comprehensive cooperative agreements on 
intelligence, border patrolling, as well as initiated exchange programs and 
joint exercises on counter-militancy.3 
Grounded partly in a growing literature seeking to explain militant impacts 
on interstate relations and existing literature on India–Myanmar relations, 
this article furthers expectations regarding the drivers of increased Indo-
Burmese counter-militancy cooperation. Examining the drivers of enhanced 
cooperation in an ambivalent interstate relationship despite resilient 
militancy and a long conflict provides nuances significant for understanding 
the complicated dynamics of the regional great power–small power Indo-
Burmese relations. It throws light on the impact of militancy on a complex 
interstate order in a mix of conflict and cooperation. 
The following section generates assumptions about the drivers of counter-
militancy cooperation, before providing a status of counter-militancy 
cooperation in the Indo-Burmese dyad. This is followed by an explanation 
of the cooperation, and finally, a conclusion.
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT DRIVERS
Four central and intertwined categories of drivers that regulate the 
impact of transnational militancy on interstate relations are: The 
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historical and present nature of the interstate relationship; the base 
state and target states’ relations with third-party states; perceptions 
of the security threat including the agenda of the militant groups; and, 
finally, economic cooperation including expectations for the future.4 The 
assumed drivers of Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation provide 
structure to the analysis. 
First, counter-militancy cooperation is part of the overall progress in 
Indo-Burmese relations. Even though ambivalence still characterizes the 
relationship, it has seen general improvement in the 2010s. New Delhi, 
which for long supported the Burmese democratic opposition, and 
Myanmar’s transition to quasi-democracy in the last decade, have made 
cooperation easier, despite the democratic letdown in Myanmar. India 
has offered US$500 million for Burmese development projects, there are 
grand intensions of strategic economic cooperation, collaboration on 
maritime security, and high-level visits have rocketed.5 In addition, costly 
and sensitive military-to-military contact may serve as an entry point to 
improve relations further. 
Therefore, understanding the nature of the interstate relationship is of 
the essence. In doing this, it is essential to note the power imbalance in 
relations. India has a nuclear capacity and in recent years has emerged 
as a regional great power. Myanmar is a small power struggling with its 
national security and economy. This may regulate how the host state and 
target state relate to one another in the context of militancy and impact 
the use of force and the acceptance of such.
Second, a driver that can lead to change in an interstate relationship is 
a third-party state. Balancing against China, an increasingly assertive 
regional and global great power and India’s rival, is the primary factor 
scholars ascribe to the overall empowerment of the India–Myanmar 
relationship. The China factor is central and feeds into the counter-
militancy cooperation both in a contextual and direct sense. Although 
transnational militancy has been a threat since the colonial period, 
fighting it is now strategically more important for New Delhi as China’s 
involvement in the neighborhood is increasing in light of its Belt and Road 
Initiative unveiled in 2013. To counter growing Chinese influence, India 
in 2014 launched the Act East policy aiming to gain more influence and 
connectivity with ASEAN6 states and beyond. In Act East, India’s regional 
security role was a heavier component compared to its predecessor, 
the Look East policy.7 There are also other external actors influencing 
Indo-Burmese relations, such as India’s archrival and neighbor Pakistan. 
Pakistan plays a critical role for India’s security, and its close alliance 
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with China amplifies Indian concerns. Moreover, changes in relations with 
neighbors, such as India’s relations with Bangladesh and Bhutan, as well as 
Myanmar’s relations with China, Pakistan and the international community, 
may influence Indo-Burmese counter-militancy collaboration.
Third, the target and host states’ security considerations directly regulate 
the way they behave vis-à-vis one another in the context of transnational 
militant attacks. Most studies focus on the target state, although the 
host state’s security perceptions are also central in understanding 
interstate counter-militancy cooperation.8 This article also includes the 
agenda of the main militant group, the National Socialist Council of 
Nagalim-Khaplang (NSCN-K). The host and target states’ relations with 
the militants are significant in explaining interstate counter-militancy 
interactions.9 The growing importance of Myanmar in India’s strategic 
priorities and its concurrent assertiveness is aligned with Myanmar’s 
security calculations. India and Myanmar do not necessarily have an equal 
interest in defeating transnational militancy, nor is it in Myanmar’s interest 
to create an unprofitable gap in its relations with China. However, it may 
be easier for Myanmar to let India handle the problem at the border, as it 
is facing worse pressure in its other border areas. 
Fourth, economic cooperation in the relationship may regulate the impact 
of militancy, and more so if the economic cooperation is of a strategic 
nature.10 In addition to existing economic interests, this article also takes 
the potential for expanding such cooperation. Because of growing Indian 
economic power and assertiveness, combined with a reaction to Beijing’s 
regional investments through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, New 
Delhi has launched a countering Act East policy. Act East includes an 
economic corridor eastwards with Myanmar as its gateway. Naypyidaw’s 
opening to foreign investors, and, ironically, the recent condemnation by 
the international community of the minority Muslim Rohingya’s exodus 
and massacre, has increasingly allowed this development. 
These new dynamics have created, in sum, a new strategic environment 
for India and Myanmar, aligned their interests, and generated incentives for 
seeking costly and sensitive interstate counter-militancy cooperation despite 
continuous conflict-inflicting transnational militancy.11 The two states have so 
far landed somewhere between fixing and managing the problem.
TRANSNATIONAL MILITANCY  
AND COOPERATION
India’s Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram states border 
Myanmar’s Kachin state, Sagaing Division and Chin state. Rakhine state, 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss2/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673
77Journal of Strategic Security
© 2018 
ISSN: 1944-0464 
eISSN: 1944-0472
India-Myanmar Relations and the Management of Transnational Militant Threats
where India has large-scale strategic and economic interests, is situated 
just south of Chin state, and borders Bangladesh. The Indo-Burmese 
border areas are home to a myriad of ethnic groups, which of many have 
led insurgencies aiming for increased autonomy against both India and 
Myanmar. In 2016 alone, groups hiding in neighboring Myanmar primarily 
conducted 50 violent incidents in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh 
and 58 incidents in the state of Nagaland.12 In early 2017, it was reported 
that about 1.000 Indian militants residing in Myanmar belong to the 
National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Khaplang (NSCN-K).13 
The militants are sub or extra-national groups that use or threaten to 
use violence in order to fulfil separatist or ideological ambitions. The 
main militant group studied in this article, NSCN-K, strives for its own 
independent state consisting of both Indian and Burmese territory. The 
militants hide across borders, launch cross-border attacks, or target 
domestic landmarks, infrastructure, or people that are important to the 
target or host state. They may have friendly or hostile relations to the host 
state, or the host state may lack capacity to control them, and they may 
enjoy third-party sponsorship. 
Transnational militancy, referring to militant actions that affect both India 
and Myanmar, has significantly deteriorated relations. It has nonetheless 
also produced cooperative counter-measures. Two types of counter-
militancy cooperation are identified in the ambivalent relationship: Direct 
counter-militancy cooperation and the host state’s pragmatic acceptance 
of the target state’s countermeasures. India and Myanmar engaged in 
direct, yet limited, counter-militancy cooperation in the post-colonial 
period. It was not until the late 2010s, however, that such cooperation 
started gaining ground. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, India and Myanmar cooperated in 
countering insurgency in form of limited arms and aircraft supplies, and 
curbing Naga insurgents’ demand for autonomy in the border areas.14 
In 1967, they signed a border agreement in light of their borderlands’ 
restiveness and had limited collaboration on counter-militancy operations 
around the same time.15 In the mid-1990s, the two states agreed on 
the intention of increasing cooperation and preventing insurgency and 
crime, and the Indian Army Chief visited Myanmar.16 They launched a 
number of counter-militancy operations in following years aimed at 
curbing India-hostile militant organizations, where Burmese forces for 
instance contributed by blocking the militants’ escape routes. However, 
this cooperation was not in full coordination or agreement, and Burmese 
efforts were sporadic and lacked effective border security regimes.17 The 
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joint efforts did not stop cross-border militant attacks from Burmese 
territory into India. Nonetheless, the security situation did improve in the 
following years.18 A significant factor in this improvement was India and 
Myanmar’s ceasefire agreements with several militant groups. 
India is believed to have supplied Myanmar with transport helicopters, 
armored personnel carriers, light guns, and tanks for countering militancy 
during the 2000s.19 Furthermore, intending to simplify movement for 
hill tribes residing in the border areas, India’s Home Ministry and the 
government of Myanmar introduced a limited visa-free movement regime 
in the border areas in 2010, meaning, “local nationals of both sides can 
stay in the other country for three days within 16 km on either side.”20 
According to Lionel M. Beehner, the agreement implies that India can 
pursue Indian rebels into Burmese territory.21 What it also signifies is free 
roaming for militants. Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh stated that it 
“is misused by militants and criminals who smuggle weapons, 
narcotics, contraband goods, and Fake Indian Currency Notes. 
Taking advantage of the free-movement regime occasionally  
they, in other words the militants, enter India, commit crimes,  
and escape to their relatively safer hide-outs.”22
In recent years, counter-militancy cooperation has made unmatched 
progress. In 2015, the two countries agreed on more coordinated security 
arrangements, allowing for enhanced patrolling coordination and cross-
border intelligence sharing.23 In addition, the Indian Army trains Burmese 
soldiers in counter-militancy.24 For instance, a Myanmar Army contingent 
trained at the India Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School in 
Mizoram in late 2017.25 In November 2017, India and Myanmar carried out 
their first joint military exercise, IMBAX-2017, at the Joint Warfare Centre 
in Meghalaya, India.26
Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation is dual-faced. Besides direct 
cooperation, Naypyidaw and the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s armed forces, 
have pragmatically accepted India’s sovereignty-breaching moves. 
While India has increased its presence in its northeast and successfully 
established deals with many militants, other groups – such as the NSCN-K, 
the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I), and the 
Coordination Committee (CorCom)– remain active. They allegedly hide 
in Burmese territory and conduct cross-border strikes targeting Indian 
soldiers, particularly in the Indian provinces of Manipur and Nagaland. 
In recent years, Bangladesh and Bhutan have largely ceased to function as 
a safe haven for India-hostile militants, and Bhutan has a comprehensive 
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security agreement with India.27 The consequence is that non-signatory 
militant groups increasingly depend on cross-border sanctuaries on 
Burmese territory for survival, and allegedly also on Chinese territory.28 
Applying terrorist tactics, the militants launch cross-border attacks on 
the Indian Army and civilians. Naypyidaw’s 2012 ceasefire agreement with 
NSCN-K limits Burmese security force presence in the group’s territory.29 
This access to extraterritorial sanctuary has secured the effectiveness 
of the militants and limited India’s room for maneuver in securing its 
strategically important northeast.30 The challenge is amplified by the 
fact that, for the Burmese, the cost of curbing the India-hostile militants 
is likely lower than the benefit. Myanmar has more severe security 
challenges involving separatist militants on its borders with China and 
Thailand. The Tatmadaw has conducted cross-border raids into Thai 
territory and urged China to stop harboring Myanmar-hostile militants, 
which have added much tension in these relations.31
The Indian government and the NSCN-K called off their ceasefire 
agreement in 2015.32 In June the same year, the Indian army executed 
a military hot pursuit into Burmese territory, allegedly killing tens of 
Naga militants in their camps. It is believed that the incursion was in 
response to militants’ killing of 18 Indian soldiers in a cross-border 
strike. The authorities in Myanmar initially denied that the cross-border 
operation ever took place. This is an expected reaction considering the 
immense importance for any nation of securing national sovereignty, 
and specifically pertinent for nations with several power centers such 
as Myanmar.33 This type of signaling is seen for instance, in Pakistan’s 
denial of Indian cross-border surgical strikes and Iranian cross-border hot 
pursuits, both following transnational militancy. In addition, admittedly, the 
Burmese government did have a ceasefire agreement with the NSCN-K.34 
In December 2017, Indian Army Chief Bipin Rawat controversially 
confirmed that Indian troops had crossed the border into Burmese 
territory. His statements were not welcomed at a time when the Indian 
government was seeking a solution around deporting Muslim Rohingya 
refugees who had fled massacre from Myanmar’s Rakhine state.35 Beehner 
describes the Indian cross-border incursion as a permissive hot pursuit, 
with the Burmese leadership denying tacit acceptance.36 The Indians 
followed up with a high-level delegation to Myanmar, but failed to 
formalize an agreement allowing military action on Burmese territory.37 
Their counterparts in Myanmar referred to the constitution’s article 42b: 
“No foreign troops shall be permitted to be deployed in the territory of 
the Union.”38 According to the Hindu, the Indians were in 2017 considering 
asking Myanmar to revoke its ceasefire agreement with NSCN-K, as it, 
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among other militant groups, was involved in “anti-India” activities in the 
border areas.39 However, it does not seem any progress was made on the 
matter, despite the threat.
A high-standing official from India’s ruling party BJP supports Beehner’s 
argument on the permissive hot pursuit. According to the official, it is 
likely that India did carry out incursions into Myanmar’s territory, although 
denied by both states. Moreover, “what is important is that if this is a fact, 
India did not carry out these specific-target incursions without consent 
from Myanmar’s government.”40 He described increasing cooperation 
in fighting transnational militancy, and said that relations had improved 
overall. He expected that Indian Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Myanmar 
in September 2017 would result in counter-militancy cooperation in areas 
other than security. Modi’s agenda did include counter-insurgency talks 
and a land-border crossing agreement, which was approved by the Indian 
cabinet in January 2018. 
In a similar 1995 raid, it was claimed that Indian and Burmese forces carried 
out a joint operation. However, in the words of an Indian officer and 
researcher who himself had a lead position in the raid; it was an operation 
solely under Indian command, with tension between Indian and Burmese 
forces.41 This supports the idea of Burmese pragmatic acceptance. 
Although much points to the aftermath of India’s cross-border strike as 
a case of pragmatic acceptance, it is only rational to not totally dismiss 
the option that there was no acceptance from the Burmese side and that 
continuing cooperation was the result of a ‘rescue mission’ by the Indian 
high-level delegation that travelled to Naypyidaw shortly after. Regardless 
of whether the acceptance was pragmatic or forced, as it did not lead to 
higher levels of conflict, it illustrates a nuance between cooperation and 
conflict in interstate relations. The following section further examines what 
has made cooperation possible despite the highly conflict-inflicting factor 
of resilient transnational militancy and even breaches of sovereignty.
THE DRIVERS OF INDO-BURMESE  
COUNTER-MILITANCY COOPERATION
The following section focus on the four categories of drivers: The nature 
of the interstate relationship; the relations with third-party states; 
perceptions of the security threat; and economic cooperation.
First, in the India-Burma case one could argue that the dyad has ripened 
enough to forge counter-militancy cooperation. However, border and 
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counter-militancy cooperation regimes are rare and costly, and most 
likely appear in cases where the host and target states share a common 
militant enemy.42 The fact that an interstate relationship has improved 
does not imply automatic enhancement of counter-militancy cooperation. 
An implication is that the nature of the India–Myanmar relationship does 
not alone determine whether transnational militancy causes more conflict, 
cooperation, or both. However, it indicates the room for maneuver 
available to the two parts; close dyads have a better foundation for 
forging cooperation than troubled ones. The other way around, the 
presence of transnational militancy in a state-to-state relationship, may 
suggest—but not always—that it has conflict-prone characteristics. 
Besides, whether the current Burmese provision of militant sanctuary is a 
result of lack of will or capacity remains somewhat unclear.
Second, the host and target states’ foreign policies vis-à-vis third-party 
states, as well as the target state’s perceptions of third-party involvement 
in transnational militancy, may serve as drivers for cooperation. This 
becomes particularly pertinent if the relation to third-party states is a 
matter of overarching strategy. 
For India, China represents both a threat at its border and possible 
supporter of anti-India militancy. India and China have been involved 
in a regional power competition for influence in Myanmar for decades, 
and India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Myanmar is permeated by the aim 
of countering Chinese influence in its neighborhood.43 China, alongside 
Pakistan, is India’s main regional competitor and the perceived threat 
from China and Pakistan has formed New Delhi’s nuclear policy, maritime 
doctrine, conventional military border preparedness, and involvement 
in regional countries. The China complex in India’s strategic thinking has 
likely also played a role in Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation 
because of the heavy Chinese involvement in Myanmar. India and China 
are involved with Burmese militants. Myanmar has served the Indo-
Chinese regional power competition for decades, and China has been 
accused of supporting anti-India militants in Myanmar.44 
Likewise, closer Indo-Burmese military ties serve as a source of 
diversification for Naypyidaw in light of periodic deterioration of 
otherwise close Sino-Burmese ties. The Tatmadaw is heavily dependent 
on weapon imports from China.45 Myanmar’s outlook has been colored 
by nationalist sentiments and xenophobia in relations with other states, 
including its relations and foreign policies vis-à-vis China and India. Within 
this, Naypyidaw has balanced India and China effectively.46 Myanmar 
would strategically benefit from balancing the influx of foreign states 
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through diversification and is probably also picking and choosing the 
most profitable deals because of the competition. An interesting example 
of cooperation diversification is Burmese acquisition of an air-search 
radar and an anti-submarine warfare sonar from India for use on a frigate 
imported from China.47 
India’s strategically important Act East Policy, thought of as a 
counterweight to China’s BRI, and implies increased Chinese interest in 
Myanmar. If India does not succeed in curbing insurgency and unrest in 
India’s northeast, the Act East will remain unrealized. The more India in 
general can engage and cooperate with Myanmar, the more likely it is that 
India gains muscles as a competitor against China and moves closer to 
its overarching strategic aims. According to Gautam Sen, who has held a 
senior position in a northeast state government, unrest in Indian Nagaland 
has decreased. Despite this, the Indian central government has declared 
it a disturbed area, which has allowed for continued military presence.48 
As the situation between India and China has become increasingly tense 
in recent years, it is only to be expected that more security forces will be 
deployed in India’s peripheries that are close to China. 
Furthermore, a factor that has made India pick up speed is Myanmar’s 
opening to the international community. This implies more international 
competition in Myanmar, and may contribute to explaining Modi’s push 
for more cooperation with Naypyidaw at a time when the international 
community is threatening to pull out.
Another incentive for India’s interest in Myanmar is Pakistan’s relations 
with Myanmar. Pakistan and China have together supposedly supplied 
the Tatmadaw with arms.49 According to Jane’s Defence in June 2017, 
Myanmar’s Air Force had ordered Chinese-Pakistani produced JF-17 
fighter jets.50 Furthermore, there have been decades-long allegations of 
Pakistani support to India-hostile militants in the area. India’s perceptions 
of Pakistani and Chinese support of Naga militants in Myanmar can serve 
as an incentive for India to engage in counter-terrorism cooperation, 
regardless of whether it is a fact. Perceptions of third-party involvement 
softens Indian views on Myanmar’s responsibility as a host state, as long 
as New Delhi considers Naypyidaw’s provision of sanctuary a result of 
lacking capacity. Moreover, Indian cross-border incursion in Myanmar 
may partly be intended to signal India’s cross-border military capability. 
Beehner argues that India carried out the “surgical strike” across the 
Burmese border with an aim to warn archrival Pakistan about its new, 
more offensive, military doctrine. This may make sense as the Pakistani 
Federal Interior Minister reacted by saying that Pakistan is not Myanmar, 
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and that Pakistan would respond to foreign aggression. In addition, India 
executed a so-called “surgical strike” into Pakistani territory in late 2016.51 
For India, cooperation with Myanmar would be beneficial also in 
these terms, as it could point to Chinese and Pakistani involvement in 
supporting anti-India separatists. Pakistan is India’s archrival and enjoys 
close strategic and economic relations with China. In the coming years, 
China aims to invest $62 billion in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC). New Delhi is the primary opponent to CPEC. Had New Delhi 
perceived Myanmar as welcoming of Chinese and Pakistani support 
of anti-India militants on Burmese territory, it would likely affect the 
possibilities of counter-militancy cooperation with Myanmar. 
Third, states’ perceptions of the threat and their experience in dealing with 
transnational militancy regulate cooperation with other involved parties. 
Having experienced resilient transnational militancy, states develop a 
consequence consciousness of their possible coercive or cooperative 
actions. Even troubled interstate couples may choose more cooperative 
counter-measures, even if it is only to avoid intractable interstate conflict. 
Moreover, if a host state, after pressure from the target state, is likely to 
compel but fail in curbing the militants, the militants may grow stronger 
and the host state’s capacity weaker: A so-called compellence dilemma. 
This may again cause a deteriorated security situation for the target state. 
In such cases, the target state may refrain from coercion and punishment 
of the host.52 In addition, counter-militancy cooperation can serve to 
de-escalate crises in the form of, for instance, permissive hot pursuits.53 
Important to note is that target states’ behavior vis-à-vis host states in 
the wake of transnational militancy can at times be explained by triadic 
deterrence, meaning that the target state applies threat and punishment 
against the host state in order to coerce it into curbing the hostile 
transnational militants.54
Furthermore, and importantly, the agenda of the militants and the threat 
they pose to the host and target states is central in forming the incentives 
for counter-militancy cooperation. Cases where the militants also work 
against the interests of the host state indicate low capacity rather than 
lack of will of the host state to combat them. This point of departure is 
less intimidating than direct support where the host state, for instance, 
provides the militants with arms and training facilities. In addition, the 
principal conflict-inflicting problem of sanctuary as a condition for militant 
organization survival becomes a bit more approachable. The target 
state’s perception of the host state’s efforts in curbing the militants is 
also important. A total lack of interest from the host state in hindering 
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the threat would likely serve as provocation, while at least an intention to 
do so may open up for cooperation. The following section examines the 
Indo-Burmese dyad in light of security gain assessments and consequence 
consciousness considerations regarding transnational militancy.
Internal security is a baseline for India’s counter-militancy cooperation 
with Myanmar, as militants have hampered economic development and 
inflicted casualties on both soldiers and civilians. Although numbers are 
decreasing, there were 3,639 militant incidents in India’s northeast in the 
years 2012–2016. One hundred and fifteen security force personnel and 
510 civilians were killed in militant violence, and militant groups kidnapped 
1,440 individuals.55 Yet the need for improving the security situation in 
India’s northeast and Myanmar has been there since the colonial period 
and does not alone explain the recent upturn in cooperation. In recent 
years, in light of Modi’s Act East policy and increasing conflict with China, 
stability in the northeast has moved higher up on the Indian agenda. 
What has changed is that India has become more assertive and willing to 
actively counter Chinese influence, and that Myanmar is increasingly the 
main base for the militants. Moreover, India has successfully expanded 
counter-militancy cooperation with Bhutan and Bangladesh, which 
are central to stability in the northeast. This may nurture the optimism 
concerning similar cooperation with Myanmar.
India has been seeking to seal the Indo-Burmese border without much 
success. There was no mutual agreement regarding the border until 1967, 
and it has since been semi-demarcated by boundary pillars. In 2013, India 
unsuccessfully attempted to build a 10 km border fence.56 According to 
debates in the Indian parliament, the Indo-Burmese border issue was still 
unresolved as of March 2016. There were still unsettled boundary pillars 
and allegations of Burmese constructions on Indian Territory.57
The Tatmadaw may experience additional unrest if it attempts to 
curb militants after signing the ceasefire agreement. The security gain 
may be higher in tacitly accepting that the Indians breach national 
sovereignty, then express anger towards them, than letting it turn into 
a less approachable or even intractable conflict.58 Myanmar has a fluid 
relationship between its militant groups, private security forces, the 
civilian government, and the Tatmadaw. As Paul Staniland notes, in 
Myanmar “[t]here is extraordinary diversity in the rules of the game 
that structure interactions between state forces and non-state armed 
groups.”59 Myanmar’s pragmatic acceptance of cross-border raids signals 
that it lacks capacity to fight the militants on its territory. Its lack of 
capacity and priorities that far overshadow India-hostile militants, as well 
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as a physically difficult mountainous terrain for countering militants, may 
outplay India’s wishes in this case. In agreement, Beehner argues that 
the main logic behind the consented hot pursuit India conducted across 
the Burmese border is that the Tatmadaw is preoccupied with conflict at 
other borders and has stretched its capacity. Additionally, in the 2010s the 
Rohingya issue in Rakhine state has preoccupied military forces.
In practice, India has largely driven the cooperation. The Burmese have 
traditionally not exhibited capacity to curb militant groups enjoying 
sanctuary on its territory. They have shown little, if any, will in half-hearted 
participation in counter-militancy operations against certain India-hostile 
militants. The Tatmadaw has at times directly supported India-hostile 
militants, seeing them as an asset in dealing with the Indian government.60 
However, this attitude may be changing. Reports from January 2017 
indicating that the Burmese are building border fences apparently in 
agreement with Indian authorities, demonstrate that the Burmese are 
investing more in counter-militancy cooperation with India.61 The Indians 
may be reluctant to acknowledge such cooperation keeping in mind 
previous local unrest caused by erecting fences. A quick solution to the 
problem is to state, “[w]e cannot stop them from constructing fences 
on their side.”62 Rather than admitting to failure, such statements may 
indicate that the Burmese fencing is in India’s interest. Furthermore, the 
Indo-Burmese joint military exercise also indicates genuine cooperation. 
In addition, the main agenda of NSCN-K, which has posed the most 
significant challenge in recent years, is to fight for an autonomous Naga 
state consisting of both Indian and Burmese territory. It has previously 
carried out attacks in both India and Myanmar. NSCN-K has been 
designated a terrorist organization by India. In essence, the group’s 
original agenda implies that it poses a threat towards India and Myanmar, 
both target and host. However, the lack of safe hideouts decreases long-
term survivability of transnational militants, which may lead to loose and 
complicated agreements between host states and militants. NSCN-K’s 
original agenda may contribute to easing counter-militancy cooperation 
for the target state, but is complicated by Myanmar’s ceasefire agreement 
with the group. As long as India views the Burmese sanctuary as a 
question of a lack of capacity to curb the militants, rather than will, it may 
serve as a driver of cooperation. 
Fourth, if the target state needs to clear the militants out of the way for 
reasons of strategic economic development, there is no other way to do 
so than to cooperate with the host state.63 This may appear as a possible 
scenario after increased incidents of transnational militant attacks have 
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become a severe challenge to existing or future economic interests that 
require a stabilized region. It may also happen that states take larger 
security risks to fulfil strategically important economic cooperation. Thus, 
a large economic cooperation potential in a state dyad may create room 
for counter-militancy cooperation, especially if the cooperation is of the 
strategic type. However, one idea that has been launched argues that 
the target state’s micro-level economic-strategic interests may affect 
its macro-level interstate conflict behavior towards the host state in the 
aftermath of transnational militancy.64 On the other hand, it may be just as 
beneficial for the target state to cooperate in order to reach its economic 
aims, depending on the character of the state dyad. The following 
paragraphs examine the economic cooperation potential in Indo-Burmese 
relations and influences counter-militancy cooperation.
Indo-Burmese relations house a great, untapped potential for mutually 
beneficial economic cooperation. Militancy is the biggest challenge for 
expanding economic and infrastructure cooperation of the strategic sort.65 
India’s Act East policy aims to increase economic and infrastructural 
connectivity between India’s mainland and South East Asia and 
necessarily traverses India’s restless northeast and Myanmar. Main projects 
are the $484 million Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport System, the 
Sittwe deep-water port, a special economic zone and a proposed natural 
gas pipeline, all situated in the Rakhine state. The state is full of natural 
resources, and located strategically in the maritime sense at the Bay of 
Bengal. Besides, Rakhine state is also at the core of Chinese strategic and 
economic interests, as a hub in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
Cross-border trade has remained low because of the high security risk 
posed by militants to Indian workers.66 Beyond that, securing Indian 
economic-strategic interests in Rakhine state has become more costly 
after the outburst of ethnic cleansing and exodus of the minority Rohingya 
inhabitants. India, along with China, has been reluctant to condemn 
the Tatmadaw’s persecution of the Rohingya, despite the otherwise 
in-chorus condemnation from the international community. There are 
indications that further development of India’s northeast, implemented 
by the central government, would see a heightened risk of insurgency 
and militant attacks against workers and infrastructure.67 Turned around, 
militancy poses the biggest threat to the success of the Act East Policy.68 
Large-scale foreign infrastructure projects in unsettled territory come 
with a security price tag, as also seen in China’s economic expansion 
abroad. The strategic nature of the economic cooperation potential is 
a significant driver in Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation and, 
more importantly, the region will see no settlement without Burmese 
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cooperation. As observed for decades, if the Burmese do not contribute 
in curbing the militants, the problem will not go away and economic 
cooperation will remain limited.
CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed the evolution of Indo-Burmese counter-militancy 
cooperation. Resilient transnational militancy challenges are a common 
source of conflict between states. Despite continuous transnational 
militancy in India and Burma’s ambivalent relations, the two have been 
able to forge limited, but growing, counter-militancy cooperation. 
A primary driver of increased counter-militancy cooperation is the 
overarching strategic aim of a more assertive India to counterbalance 
China’s influence in its neighborhood. India is also worried that the 
Chinese are lending support to India-hostile militants in Myanmar, which 
may feed directly into New Delhi’s wish to engage the Tatmadaw in 
advantageous but costly cooperation. Balancing against Chinese influence 
is partly done by introducing strategic economic projects in the region 
that are viable competitors to Chinese interests and BRI, and partly by 
making the stakes of cooperating with India higher for Myanmar through 
mutually beneficial strategic security and economic cooperation. The 
strategic end aims of the security and economic cooperation respectively 
are interlinked. They are also accomplished by supporting Myanmar at a 
time when few others are. The key to moving towards materialization of 
the Act East Policy is stabilizing India’s northeast and Myanmar. 
The target state’s perceptions of the host state’s capacity and efforts 
to curb the militants are central in furthering cooperation. In addition, 
extraterritorial militants cannot be curbed without cooperation of the 
host state. Either because of lack of will or capacity, Naypyidaw and 
the Tatmadaw are providing sanctuary to the militants that sustain 
transnational militancy – the success factor for transnational militants. By 
pragmatic acceptance of Indian hot pursuits across the border, they do 
signal lack of capacity rather than will. The perception that the host state 
lacks capacity is an enabler for counter-militancy cooperation. The fact 
that Naga militants in their primary aim of an autonomous state pose a 
threat to both India and Myanmar, eases cooperation and adds to the view 
that the Tatmadaw lacks capacity to curb the militants. 
From an Indian perspective, engaging Myanmar, in combination with 
striking deals with militant groups, has till now proven to be the most 
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efficient way of fighting militancy and getting closer to the achieving the 
overarching strategic aim of countering Chinese influence in the region. 
Existing literature focuses solely on either transnational militancy, state-
to-state relations or on state-militant relations within one state. This 
case study merges elements from these traditionally divided scholarly 
traditions and provides a reminder that target states do not respond to 
militancy in a vacuum. More empirical and theoretical studies are needed 
to fill this gap. 
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